



Designing an effective cause and effect matrix for use in PHA and at shop floor level

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




Process Safety Contents





















Introduction





OSHA's PSM standard requires a management system with 14 elements.

Process Safety Information (PSI) is one of these elements.

Information on the equipment in the process must include the following:

- Materials of construction,
- Safety systems (e.g., interlocks, detection, or suppression systems).

It is a common practice to use a cause and effect matrix to provide necessary information on safety systems.



















A Safety Instrumented Function (SIF) matrix is a tool used to document and visualize the relationships between various process conditions (causes) and the corresponding safety actions (effects) that need to be taken to mitigate risks. Common information included in a SIF cause and effect matrix typically encompasses the following elements:

- Unique identification number
- TAG number related to PID
- Threshold
- Actions
- SIL level



















V0901 feed valve from truck	V0901 balance valve to truck	V0901 bottom valve	V0901 recirc. valve	Loa pu
XV9011	XV9012	XV9013	XV9014	P9

Cause 902 P903 Set Delay Interlock SIL FC FC Tag No. Reset FC FC System Description Stop Stop level point ltem LS0902 I-2901-01 High level in V0901 6000 mm Cls Stop I-2901-02 V0901 Low level in V0901 LS0902 100 mm Μ Cls Stop I-2901-03 V0901 High pressure in V0901 PS0903 4 kPa Μ Cls Cls Cls Stop I-2901-04 Low pressure in V0901 PS0903 -1 kPa Stop Μ











Unloading pump









	Safeguard	S91501A	S91501B	S91501C	S91501D	S91501E
	Description	F91501 chamber Temperature	F91501 chamber Temperature	F91501 chamber Temperature	Main pipeline FID VOC-LEL	Main pipeline FTA VOC-LEL
	TAG	TICAY9150101	TICAY9150103	TICAY9150105	LELAY9150301	LELAY9150302
	Level	۲,	LY	۲۸	HHY	HHY
	Set point	760°C	760°C	760°C	25% LEL	25% LEL
	SIL level	SIL1	SIL1	SIL1	SIL2	SIL2
TAG Number						
HXYV9150301 (way 1: vent to atmos	vent to atmosphere)		open	open	open	open
HXYV9150301 (way 2: enter to RTO	inlet)	close	close	close	close	close
HXYV9150302 (way 1: vent to atmos	phere)	open	open	open	open	open
HXYV9150302 (way 2: enter to RTO	inlet)	close	close	close	close	close



















common information allow defining a safeguard These regarding its three fundamental characteristics:

- effectiveness
- reliability
- independence
















Application to a storage tank





















Application to a storage tank





	Deviation	Cause	Frequency	Scenario	Severity	Risk	LOPA	PFD	Residual risk
	High pressure	fault	One mistake every 1 to 10 years	If operator does not close alcohol feeding valve to reactor. During N2 feeding in reactor, N2 backflow to storage V0901. When pressure reaches 3 kPa,			PS0903 SP: 4 kPa Actions: closes V0901bottom	0.1	acceptab
		Storage vent valve fails	Failure once every 10years		high		valve XV9013 and recirculation valve XV9014 (SIL1)		le
















Application to a RTO



RTO: Regenerative Thermal Oxidizer



















Application to a RTO





Deviatio	n Cause	Frequency	Scenario	Severity	Risk	LOPA	PFD	Residual risk
ion (high flammab e vapor	one a reactor or several reactors	Several times per year based on site feedback	If several reactors vent at the same time, flammable vapor concentration in vent network increases above LEL. When flammable vapor reach the RTO, it is ignited due to the open flame inside the RTO. Explosion backflow in vent network causes explosion in equipment connected to it	high	unaccept able	two LEL detectors SP: 25% LEL Actions: open HXYV9150301 and HXYV9150302 to the atmosphere (SIL2)	0.01	intermedi ate



















If a cause and effect matrix is presented as in two above examples, it can mislead the PHA working group to a false sense of safety.

What information is missing in the matrix?




















The SIF response time!



*Image source: Process Group Limited

SIF Response Time (SRT) is a function of:

- Speed of detection
- Logic processing
- Final element completion

SRT must be shorter than the length of time between the SIF set point being reached and the unwanted even being mitigated.



















The response time is part of the effectiveness of the safeguard and it should be as important as the "effect" part in a cause and effect matrix but surprisingly this information is usually missing from the matrix.

If a matrix indicates the response times, people will probably think about it during the PHA.















Application to a storage tank





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V0901 feed valve from truck	V0901 balance valve to truck	V0901 bottom valve	V0901 recirc. valve	Loading pump	Unloading pump
XV9011	XV9012	XV9013	XV9014	P902	P903

Cause

Interlock Item	System	Description	SIL level	Tag No.	Set point	Delay [s]	Reset	SIF response time	FC	FC	FC	FC	Stop	Stop
I-2901-01	V0901	High level in V0901	1	LS0902	6000 mm	0	М		Cls				Stop	
I-2901-02	V0901	Low level in V0901	1	LS0902	100 mm	0	М				Cls			Stop
I-2901-03	V0901	High pressure in V0901	1	PS0903	4 kPa	0	М	5 sec.	Cls		Cls	Cls	Stop	
I-2901-04	V0901	Low pressure in V0901	1	PS0903	-1 kPa	0	М							Stop















Application to a storage tank





Storage design pressure	6	[kPa]
Storage volume	60	[m3]
Maximum filling ratio	80	[%]
Minimum free space	12	[m3]
N2 valve Cv on reactor	4.8	[gpm - 1 PSI]
N2 valve upstream pressure	3	[barg]
Maximum N2 flowrate	318	[kg/h]
Maximum N2 flowrate	265	Nm3/h
PS0903 set point	4	[kPa]
Temperature	288	[deg. C]
n (mole needed to increase pressure from PS0903 set point to storage deign pressure)	10.0	[mol]
N2 molar mass	0.028	[kg/mol]
Time to increase pressure from PS0903 set point to storage design pressure	3.2	[s]

PS0903 is not efficient for this case.

The risk increases from acceptable to intermediate.















Application to a RTO





	Safeguard number	S91501A	S91501B	S91501C	S91501D	S91501E
	Description	F91501 chamber Temperature	F91501 chamber Temperature	F91501 chamber Temperature	Main pipeline FID VOC-LEL	Main pipeline FTA VOC-LEL
	TAG	TICAY9150101	TICAY9150103	TICAY9150105	LELAY9150301	LELAY9150302 FTA VOC-LEL
	Level	LY	LY	LY	ННҮ	ННҮ
	Set	760°C LY	760°C LY	760°C LY	25% LEL	25% LEL
	SIL level	SIL1	SIL1	SIL1	SIL2	SIL2
	response time				18 sec.	18 sec.
sį	ohere)	open	open	open	open	open
i	nlet)	close	close	close	close	close
sp	ohere)	open	open	open	open	open
i	nlet)	close	close	close	close	close

TAG Number						
HXYV9150301 (way 1: vent to atmosp	here)	open	open	open	open	open
HXYV9150301 (way 2: enter to RTO in	nlet)	close	close	close	close	close
HXYV9150302 (way 1: vent to atmosphere)		open	open	open	open	open
HXYV9150302 (way 2: enter to RTO in	nlet)	close	close	close	close	close















Application to a RTO





Pipe diameter	1.2	[m]
Pipe length between LEL detectors and vent valves to atmosphere HXYV9150301/HXYV9150302	175	[m]
Maximum vent flowrate to RTO	42000	[m3/h]
Time for gas to flow down from LEL detector to vent valves to atmosphere HXYV9150301/HXYV9150302	17.0	[s]

LELAY 9150301 and 9150302 are not efficient for this case.

The risk increases from intermediate to unacceptable.



















Warning!

The theoretical SIF response time provided by the supplier and the real response time may not be the same.

For RTO case the theoretical response time was **8 seconds**:

- Sampling time 3 seconds
- Analysis time 2 seconds
- Valve closing/opening time: 3 seconds

However the site measured a response time of 18 seconds.

-> if response time is included in the matrix, it must be measured on real conditions during the initial SIF test and then during all periodic SIF tests.




















What can we do if the SIF response time is too long to prevent the unwanted event?




















Increase the process safety time






















Reduce the SIF response time






















Lower the SIF set point























Indicating the response times of the safeguards is the first improvement we can bring to a standard matrix.

The second improvement is also linked to one of the 14 PSM elements: MOC - and more specifically to temporary MOC: bypassing of a safeguard.

















Requirements and observations:



- approval process
- risk assessment
- compensatory measures
- by bass duration
- record and communication to concerned employees.

Bypassing a safeguard is usually approved by shift leader or production manager. But in some sites, the risk assessment is not done because these people don't have easy access to PHA or they don't know where to find the information in the PHA tables.



















Proposed solution:

Use the cause and effect matrix to indicate the risk level when the safeguard is bypassed that is to say if the PFD of the

safeguard is taken as 1 in the PHA.

								Effect	V0901 feed valve from truck	V0901 balance valve to truck	V0901 bottom valve	V0901 recirc. valve	Loading pump	Unloading pump
	Cause								XV9011	XV9012	XV9013	XV9014	P902	P903
System	Description	SIL level	Tag No.	Set point	Delay [s]	Reset	SIF response time	Risk after bypass	FC	FC	FC	FC	Stop	Stop
V0901	High level in V0901	1	LS0902	6000 mm	0	М		Accept.	Cls				Stop	
V0901	Low level in V0901	1	LS0902	100 mm	0	М		Accept.			Cls			Stop
V0901	High pressure in V0901	1	PS0903	4 kPa	0	М	5 sec.	Interm.	Cls		Cls	Cls	Stop	
V0901	Low pressure in V0901	1	PS0903	-1 kPa	0	M		Interm.						Stop









TAG Number

HXYV9150302 (way 2: enter to RTO inlet)



Response



open

close

Interm

open

close



18 sec.

open

close open

close





Pros and cons:



- Easy and formal risk assessment accessible to everyone, including workshop operators
- Possibility to adjust compensatory measures and approval process based on the risk level
- Need to update the matrix regularly. If not, it provides wrong information so people might underestimate the risk of bypassing a safeguard. However with ongoing digitalization of sites and AI, this updating task may become fully automatic in the future.















Conclusion Cess Safety Charing





- Each matrix is different from one site to another.
- It should contain the basic information necessary to characterize a safeguard (independency, efficiency, reliability)
- SIF response time is an integral part of the efficiency of the SIF
- Listen to on-site personnel and customize your matrix based on everyone needs



































